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Chapter 4 
Watching the Adwatches 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul A. Waldman 
Adwatches have the potential to enhance the quality of campaigns by cre-
ating disincentives for candidates to make dubious claims and by inviting 
a backlash from the knowledgeable citizenry if the ads overstep the line. 
Adwatches can have undesirable consequences in both areas as well. When 
adwatches carefully examine the accuracy and fairness of ads, they provide 
a powerful disincentive for campaigns to lie or launch unfair attacks. 
When ad watches are performed regularly, they help citizens evaluate not 
only specific candidate claims but the persuasive process in general. 
Adwatching emerged in large part as a response on the part of the 
journalistic community to the 1988 presidential election. Among the rea-
sons that that general election campaign was noteworthy is the fact that 
for the first time in the television age, ads for one major party presidential 
candidate lied blatantly. Specifically, Bush's "tank" ad charged falsely that 
Dukakis had opposed "virtually every defense system we have developed." 
Among others, the Democrat favored the Trident II submarine and the 05 
missile and SSN2l Sea wolf attack submarine. "He opposed the Stealth 
bomber" said the ad, when, in fact, Dukakis supported that project. 
Another of the Bush ads invited the false inference that Dukakis freed 268 
fIrst-degree murderers to rape and kidnap. In fact, four were furloughed 
and then only after their sentences had been downgraded from "first-
degree murder not eligible for parole." And of these convicts, only one, 
William Horton. kidnapped and raped (Jamieson 1992). 
Nor were the Democrats above reproach in 1988. An ad for Dukakis 
claimed that Bush had cast the "tie-breaking Senate vote to cut Social Secu-
rity benefits" when instead, the Republican had voted to eliminate a cost-
of-living adjustment in benefits, thus eroding purchasing power but not 
diminishing the actual level of benefits. Many reporters and editors felt that 
the Bush campaign successfully focused coverage on distracting issues, By 
repeating Bush's ads' claims without an accompanying assessment of their 
accuracy and relevance to governance, the press allowed the campaign to 
center on the Horton case, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Boston Harbor 
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Watching the Adwatches 107 
rather than the emerging savings and loan crisis or the demise of the Soviet 
Union. Consequently, the door was opened for a news format that would 
critique candidate advertising with two goals in mind: keeping candidates 
and consultants honest and creating a more informed electorate. 
In an effort to address this issue, CNN worked with Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson and a research team at the University of Pennsylvania's Annen-
berg School for Communication to devise a broadcast format for cri-
tiquing ads. The primary challenge was to focus viewers' attention on the 
recontextualization offered by the reporter as opposed to the dynamic 
visual, verbal, and musical elements of the ad itself. Tests indicated that 
the most effective format had four basic elements. First, when a portion of 
the ad was shown, it would be placed in a mock television screen moved to 
the background and set at an angle to the viewer. Second, a news logo and 
a notice that this was a political ad for a candidate would be present on 
screen when the ad was being shown. Third, relevant portions of the ad 
would be shown with the screen frozen when the reporter commented on a 
portion of the ad. Finally, print correctors such as the words correct,false, 
or misleading would be placed across the screen when the reporter evalu-
ated an ad's claim. These elements were designed to increase the likelihood 
that viewers would focus on the reporter's reframing. 
Adwatching in 1992 
As adwatches became common in 1992, consultants surmised that clearly 
false ads would run the risk of exposure by the press and of subsequent 
negative effects at the ballot box. Although the level of attack in the 1992 
presidential ads was high, so too was the level of accuracy. When distor-
tions occurred, they fell into the category offailing to tell the whole story. 
So, for example, while as a Clinton ad claimed, Bush did "sign the second 
biggest tax increase in American history," that act required the complicity 
of the Democratic Congress. And yes, as another Clinton ad averred, 
17,000 Arkansans had moved "from welfare to work" since July 1989. But 
during that time, noted reporters, the number on the welfare rolls actually 
increased as new recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
and food stamps replaced the beneficiaries of the Clinton jobs program. 
The distortions in a 1992 radio ad forecast one that would dominate 
the 1996 Democratic television ads. In it, Republican plans to cap entitle-
ments at the rate of inflation became "slashing benefits for nearly 30 mil-
lion older Americans." And a Bush television ad populated with working 
folk about to be taxed into the poorhouse foreshadowed the central false 
claim of the 1996 Republican ads; instead of raising taxes on upper-income 
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108 Campaign Reform 
earners, the ad forecast that the Democrat planned to raise taxes on the 
middle class. 
While the number of people who see a single broadcast or print 
adwatch may be small, candidates can use adwatches against their oppo-
nents in subsequent ads to counter misleading claims. "George Bush is 
running attack ads," noted the unseen announcer in a 1992 Clinton ad. 
"He says all these people [the ad shows those pictured in the Bush ad] 
would have their taxes raised by Bill Clinton. 'Misleading,' says the Wash-
ington Post. And the Wall Street Journal says, 'Clinton has proposed to cut 
taxes for the sort of people featured in Bush's ad.'" This spot was seen by 
many more voters than had read either adwatch in the two newspapers. 
As important, the adwatches had a prophylactic effect. One television 
newsperson told Times Mirror that the debunking of the ads "is the pri-
mary reason why no Willie Horton ads or their cousins have appeared in 
this [1992] campaign. Our coverage is keeping the bastards honest." Sev-
enty-seven percent of the reporters surveyed after the election approved of 
these policing efforts. "We'll need a Teddy White to come along later to see 
if those who planned commercials really sat around worrying about 
whether we'd criticize them or not," another editor told the surveyors 
(Times Mirror Center 1992). 
After the 1992 election, we asked the consultants that question. "It 
was a terrible feeling when 1 used to open the [New York] Times and they 
used to take my commercial apart, or [when I would] watch CNN and 
watch them take it apart. ... I think these reality checks made our com-
mercials less effective," observed Bush-Quayle adman Harold Kaplan at 
an Annenberg School conference. "I spent more time talking about eco-
nomics and the latest statistics from the Bureau of Labor statistics and the 
Bureau of Census than I thought a creative person ever would in her life-
time," recalled Clinton-Gore ad director Mandy Grunwald. "Gene Sper-
ling, who was the economic director of the Clinton campaign, and I talked 
far more than almost any two people in the campaign [determining 
whether it was] appropriate to use this statistic or not." 1 
Judging from these comments, it appears that in 1992, adwatches 
were satisfying one of the two criteria for success: they made media con-
sultants more careful about accuracy, reducing the likelihood of mislead-
ing claims appearing in advertising. The change, however, was short-lived. 
Adwatching in the Health Care Reform Debate 
Between September 8, 1993, and July 15, 1994, under a Robert Wood John-
son Foundation grant, an Annenberg School research team analyzed more 
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Watching the Adwatches 109 
than $50 million worth of advertising directed at legislators through voters 
as well as press coverage of the policy debate. At issue was pending legis-
lation on health care reform. If 1992 illustrated the success of adwatches, 
the health care reform debate showed where press scrutiny of ads can go 
wrong. Less than 10 percent of the reporting on ads examined their fair-
ness or accuracy. Instead, press commentary focused on strategy: the tac-
tics behind the ads, the groups being appealed to, and the advertising's 
effect on the Clinton plan's prospects. This is a particularly glaring lapse, 
given the complexity of the health care issue and the lack of public under-
standing of the different proposed plans. 2 The 10 percent of the reporting 
that focused on accuracy was clustered in the first three weeks of February 
1994, when a problematic ad by the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) elicited broadcast adwatches by Lisa Myers of NBC and Brooks 
Jackson of CNN as well as editorial condemnation by the Washington 
Post. 
"The Republicans," says the announcer of the DNC ad. "First they 
said there was no recession. Now they say there is no health care crisis. 
They just don't get it." To the consternation of the Democrats, the idea 
that there was no health care "crisis" entered the national debate on the 
decidedly Democratic lips of New York's Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni-
han. Minority Leader Bob Dole then took up the claim. Moynihan 
specified that the crisis was not in health care but in health care coverage 
and cost. A number of Republicans took essentially the same position, 
including Republican Governors Christine Todd Whitman and Carroll 
Campbell. "There's a crisis for people who don't have health care. And 
there is a crisis in financing. But there is not a crisis in the whole medical 
system," said Campbell on a Sunday interview show. The DNC ad 
reduced that statement to Campbell saying "There's not a crisis." Rather 
than correcting the ad's misstatement of Campbell's view and explaining 
the importance of identifying the precise areas of need, most news 
accounts reduced the exchange to the level of partisan bickering, what 
some call "he said/she said" journalism. 
So, for example, the Wall Street Journal (February 16, 1994, B5) 
headed its coverage "Democrats' Ad for Health Care Reform Distorts 
Governor's Position, GOP Says." After initially treating the exchange as 
charge and countercharge without offering arbitration, the Washington 
Post broke from "he said/she said" to print Campbell's actual words and 
to editorialize against the DNC's distortion of them. The ad's producer, 
Mandy Grunwald, was given space to respond on the Post's op-ed page. 
The ad also contained other distortions, which were pointed out in the 
broadcast adwatches which, for balance, also examined misleading state-
ments in a number of ads opposing the Clinton plan. 
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110 Campaign Reform 
There was, in other words, a three-week period in February 1994 that 
contained a flurry of adwatching. With what, if any, effect? Ads about the 
health care reform debate had begun airing in the fall of 1993 and contin-
ued through the summer of 1994. On average, one out of two of the ads 
aired in each week up to the second week in February had contained at 
least one misleading statement. For the three weeks following the burst of 
adwatching, that average dropped to one in five before returning to an 
average of one in three. That jump in misleading claims did not elicit 
adwatching. The proportion then inched back to just over one of two-a 
level that continued until April when, for a week, three out of four of the 
ads contained some form of deception. Then as the debate began to sub-
side, so too did the level of inaccuracy, which dropped to just below one 
out of two with minor variation through the rest of the debate. The num-
ber of ads aired per week did not drop after the adwatching; the propor-
tion of pro-Clinton (1/3) and anti-Clinton plan (2/3) ads did not change; 
the only change was in the level of accuracy of the average ad. This pattern 
raises the possibility that the consultants creating the ads responded to the 
adwatching by engaging in self-correction, tested the waters to see whether 
adwatching would return, and, finding that it didn't, returned to their ear-
lier practices. 
During the health care reform debate, most of the adwatching 
focused on strategy rather than accuracy. "While the ad plays effectively 
on many people's fears," notes a "scorecard" in a Sunday New York Times 
(July 17, 1994, 16) of an ad by Citizens for a Sound Economy, "its Darth 
Vader tone works against it. It has an overblown quality that slips danger-
ously close to the tone of a spoof. But it closes on a strong point, appeal-
ing to viewers' pragmatism with a warning that Congress should just fix 
what is broken in the health care system instead of embarking on a top-to-
bottom overhaul." Such analysis is helpful to readers planning a career in 
political consulting but useless to those trying to make sense of the con-
troversy over access and choice in the health care debate. 
Of equal concern was the fact that two of the four networks that had 
faithfully employed our ad watch formula in 1992 were now airing ads full 
screen. Some of the other practices we had argued against in 1988 were 
back as well. A number of broadcast ads received more free airtime in 
news than paid time. This lapse might be unimportant if the ads were accu-
rate, but an analysis of 73 broadcast and 125 printed ads revealed that 
more than half of those aired and more than a quarter of those printed 
were unfair, misleading, or deceptive (Annenberg Public Policy Center 
1995). 
We documented the demise of adwatching, the resurrection of strat-
egy-driven coverage, and the escalating inaccuracy of the ads. At a confer-
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Watching the Adwatches 111 
ence sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg Public Pol-
icy Center on July 15, 1994, reporters from the major networks and news-
papers sat down with us at the National Press Club to talk about reporting 
on health care and our results. After 1988, changes in press practice were 
driven by a pervasive belief that both the reporters and the candidates had 
failed the electorate. No such sense filled discussions of the health-reform 
debate. As a result, prodding that had worked in 1992 failed in 1994. A 
column by David Broder urging revival of adwatches on health care ads 
failed to elicit them.3 Reports of our findings in the New York Times and 
Washington Post and an op-ed in the Washington Post also did not prompt 
a rush of adwatching. 
What effect we had occurred on the margins. National Public Radio 
and the MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour did shift from strategy-based reporting 
on ads to a structure that included analysis of accuracy. And when the 
Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) released a new set of 
"Harry and Louise" ads the week after our conference, our attendees 
ignored them. Since earlier ads featuring the yuppie couple obsessing 
about weaknesses in the Clinton plan had garnered almost five and a half 
free minutes of uncritical national news time and seven hundred press 
mentions in the previous eleven months, this phenomenon did represent a 
change. As one of the reporters who attended the conference told us, a tree 
fell in the woods and no one reported it. 
Adwatching in 1996 
In late May 1996, the Democrats began broadcasting an ad attacking Bob 
Dole's Senate departure as "quitting, giving up, leaving behind the grid-
lock he helped create." Backed by a $1.2 million ad buy in key states, the 
ad, titled "Empty" by the Democratic campaign, was critiqued in fifty-
nine editorials and print articles and on twenty-nine national radio and TV 
broadcasts. USA Today columnist Walter Shapiro called the ad "snarky" 
(May 29, 1996, 6A). Liberal columnist Mary McGrory observed that the 
person who created the "quitter" ad should "be reassigned to snipe detail 
in rural Idaho." She added, "Dole has a long history of sticking to what he 
does-like 36 years on Capitol Hill-and it's not a term you would slap on 
an old infantryman on Memorial Day weekend. It's hard to imagine what 
the audience was for such a low, hard blow" (Washington Post, May 28, 
1996, A2). 
On the Newshour (May 28, 1996), Jim Lehrer questioned Hillary Clin-
ton about whether the ad shouldn't be interpreted as an attack on Dole's 
character and integrity and asked, "Is that clean campaigning?" The 
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112 Campaign Reform 
Boston Glohe called the ad "terribly bad form," noting, "When Dole 
announced his decision to step down from the Senate, after nearly three 
decades of service, the president praised him lavishly: 'You have served 
your country in so many ways,' Clinton told the Senate majority leader. 
'On behalf of a grateful America, I want to thank you.' Now his campaign 
committee is running ads accusing Dole of dereliction of duty for leaving 
the Senate" (June 2. 1996, 26). Writing in the St. Petershurg Times, 
Howard Troxler called the ad "a surprisingly mean and desperate attack 
for a guy who is supposedly 20 points ahead in the polls" (May 31, 1996, 
3A). Writing in the Washington Post, nationally syndicated columnist 
David Broder called the charge of "quitting" "a stunningly unseemly 
choice of words for a man who walked away from his Vietnam-era 
promise to join the National Guard and from his 1990 campaign promise 
to Arkansas voters to serve out his four year term" (June 2, 1996, C7). 
Neli'sday said that airing the ad put Clinton "into the Halloween mode" 
(June I, 1996, AI8). A Scripps-Howard News Service editorial called the 
ad "unpresidential" (Rocky Mountain Nell'S, June I, 1996, 56A). An edito-
rial in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch said of the label quitter, "To say this of 
a man who overcame severe physical disabilities caused by his war wounds 
is absurd and offensive" (June L 1996, 14B). In an adwatch in the Nel\' 
York Times, Adam Nagourney also noted that Clinton had not kept his 
word to Arkansans when he failed to serve out his four-year term as gov-
ernor (May 25, 1996, 10). Members of Clinton's own party, including 
some of Dole's Senate colleagues, also criticized the ad. 
The "Empty" ad was a response to a Republican ad that was pre-
viewed for the press and widely discussed but never aired. That ad, titled 
"Stripes," pilloried the claim that as commander in chief-and hence on 
active military duty-Clinton could postpone the Paula Jones sexual-
harassment trial. With its pictures of Clinton jogging and biking, that ad 
also cast Clinton as a slacker. Since one was previewed in the week that the 
other started airing, commentators paired the two ads, with Democrats as 
well as Republicans criticizing both. Maine's Senator William Cohen said, 
"I would like to see a much higher road traveled by both parties" (CNN 
News, May 28, 1996). Jamieson added, "I think the important thing right 
now is that a clear message be sent to both candidates and to both parties 
from the American people. from the journalistic community and from the 
academic community saying that this is not worthy of us. This was a poor 
illustration of democracy; let's get on to the substance" (CNN, May 28, 
1996). On National Public Radio, Daniel Schorr suggested that the ads 
might indicate that "there is a mole high up in both campaign organiza-
tions committing sabotage of their principals" (May 28, 1996). Columnists 
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Watching the Adwatches 113 
and commentators condemned both ads as attacks on the person rather 
than his policies. 
The aftermath of this outpouring of criticism is noteworthy. Saying 
that a change in the Clinton legal strategy had made the ad irrelevant, the 
Republicans decided not to air the "Stripes" ad. By the end of the week, 
the Democratic ad too had disappeared. In public settings Democratic 
consultants argued that the ad had run its course.4 In any case, the claims 
in the ads would not recur in any form in advertising for the two major-
party candidates in the next five months. And unlike both of these ads, 
none of their subsequent ads can be classed as ad hominem attacks. No 
other ads aired in the 1996 general election presidential campaign would 
produce a comparable avalanche of disapproval. 
There was some other evidence of candidate responsiveness to criti-
cism of ads in 1996. Since it aired late on a Friday evening in the fall of 
1996, only insomniacs were likely to have heard an ad for a candidate for 
president link the practices of his opponents to the preaching of Lenin. But 
that's just what a Ross Perot infomercial did. Perot "writes his own 
speeches," said the ad. Pictures of Clinton and Dole then appeared as the 
female announcer added, "the other two candidates have teams of profes-
sional speech writers to test their speeches with focus groups." And then 
the zinger. "They are following Lenin's advice, 'Tell the people what they 
want to hear. '" This instance was one of the few in the 1996 campaign in 
which adwatching demonstrably made a difference. As part of Jamieson's 
weekly evaluation of the discourse of the campaign for CNN and in a syn-
dicated op-ed piece, she singled this portion of the infomercial out for con-
demnation. The next time Perot aired the taped introduction in which it 
had appeared, the reference to Lenin had been edited out. 
Later that fall, a different ad was pulled for factual reasons. The 
Republicans' first ad on campaign finance, "Riady 1," was reedited (after 
airing once on CNN) when its first showing elicited thirteen critical arti-
cles and adwatching stories. These analyses challenged the veracity of the 
claim that Clinton had "more investigations, prosecutions and convic-
tions than any administration in two decades." That distinction belonged 
to the Reagan administration, which was investigated by nine indepen-
dent counsels; at that point Clinton's administration had been investi-
gated by four. In the Reagan-era Housing and Urban Development and 
Iran-Contra scandals, twenty-eight people were convicted. At that point, 
only Webster Hubbell had been convicted on Clinton's watch. The 
revised version made implicit the comparison that had been explicit, say-
ing, "More investigations, more prosecutions and more convictions, and 
the list goes on and on." Co
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114 Campaign Reform 
Other instances in the 1996 general election in which ads were 
changed suggest the power of media reports of a strong protest from a 
nationally visible. widely respected group cited in the ad. When Common 
Cause protested the implication of a Democratic ad that the group was 
critical of Dole·s record on campaign finance reform but not of Clinton·s 
record on the subject. the Democrats stopped airing the piece. The Repub-
licans had a comparable experience. The day after previewing an ad on 
Medicare that quoted the American Association of Retired Persons 
(AARP). Dole·s campaign responded to media reports ofa protest by the 
AARP and withdrew the ad. The ad had said that "The AARP. the largest 
and most respected citizen group. said both sides have proposals 'which 
would slow the rate of growth.··' But it neglected to mention that the 
AARP had also said that the GOP plan went "far beyond what the pro-
gram can absorb without jeopardizing quality and access to care."s Hav-
ing withdrawn the first ad, the Republicans then aired a second piece that 
also drew an AARP objection. 
The other lesson of the 1996 corrections is that an ad will be changed 
if a nationally visible and respected person is offended. So, for example, 
after Nancy Reagan objected to its use, footage of the Reagan assassina-
tion attempt was dropped from a Democratic testimonial ad featuring Jim 
Brady. who was also injured that day. Noteworthy in the general election 
of 1996 is the t~lct that, unlike in 1992. adwatching for accuracy was lim-
ited largely to the print press. With the exception of Lehrer's NC)\'s/lOur 
and National Public Radio. there was no regular broadcast adwatching on 
television. Whereas in 1992 Brooks Jackson had provided regular tests of 
ads. in 1996 his time was devoted instead to "following the money:' In 
Septembcr. for example. only three of the sixteen network evening news 
stories covering the candidates' ads focused on their accuracy. On ABC 
Jeff Greenfield corrected a Clinton ad on drug programs by saying, "But 
one former government official says that, in fact, both parties bear respon-
sibility for brushing aside the key to stopping teenage drug use·· (Septem-
ber 9, 1996). On CBS Eric Engberg noted that Clinton had in fact 
appointed a drug czar but that "He also failed to deliver on the pledge to 
put far more money into treatment and prevention programs" (September 
22, 1996). And on CBS. Sandra Hughes challenged Pero(s claim that 76 
percent of Americans wanted him in the debates by citing a CBS poll to the 
contrary (September 22, 1996). 
More typical was coverage that commented on the ads' strategic 
importance, as in this September 20. 1996, example from ABC: 
Sam Donaldsoll: By late today, the Clinton ad team had their 
response ad shot. [Excerpt from ad.] And that's how it goes in 
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Watching the Adwatches 115 
modern campaigns, punch and counterpunch within hours of each 
other. Whatever the road they take they'll both travel at about 
ninety miles an hour between now and election day. 
The strategic focus of most adwatches is not surprising, since strategy is 
the primary focus of all campaign coverage (Patterson 1993). Political 
reporters can view ads and come up with an immediate strategic assessment; 
campaign strategy is, after all, their area of expertise. To evaluate an ad's 
accuracy, however, research, including consulting additional sources, may 
be required. This expends a precious resource, time. In fact, as a content 
analysis by Bennett (1997) revealed, 70 percent of print adwatches and 100 
percent of broadcast adwatches in 1996 focused on campaign strategy. 
Given that strategy coverage has been shown to elevate cynicism in some 
cases (Cappella and Jamieson 1997), these figures are particularly troubling. 
In addition, both print and broadcast outlets ran far fewer adwatches 
than they had in 1992. If the campaigns were paying attention, they would 
have quickly realized that advertising claims were unlikely to be addressed 
at all; claims that were addressed would be assessed for effectiveness rather 
than accuracy. Whether the amount of deception in advertising can be 
directly attributed to the drop in broadcast adwatching is difficult to 
know, but in 1992, the number of televised ads containing distortions and 
selective uses of evidence was comparatively small, with 14 percent (seven 
ads of fifty-one) containing a questionable claim. By contrast, in 1996, 52 
percent (thirty-two of sixty-two) of the ads televised after the start of the 
conventions contained at least one problematic claim. 
There is no significant difference in the relative level of deception in 
the Dole and Clinton ads. The Clinton campaign averaged .8 deceptive 
claims per ad; the Dole campaign .9 deceptive claims per spot. The most 
often aired Democratic deception occurred in nine of Clinton's thirty-
seven postconvention ads. It said in one form or another that Dole would 
"slash" Medicare, cutting it $270 billion. What the ad didn't say was that 
although the Republican plan would have cut the rate more sharply than 
the Democrats' plan, both the Democrats and the Republicans planned to 
slow the rate of increase. 
The most frequently televised Republican distortion suggested that 
Clinton's tax increase had fallen most heavily if not entirely on the middle 
class. Where one ad tied the full Clinton tax increase to pictures of blue-
collar workers, three others explicitly claimed that Clinton gave the middle 
class either a large tax increase or the largest increase in history. In fact, 
the Clinton tax increase primarily affected the upper 1.2 percent of income 
earners and high-end Social Security recipients. The increase in the gas tax 
affected everyone with a car. 
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116 Campaign Reform 
One way of surmising that adwatching has not been effective is the 
reappearance of a claim already shown by adwatchers to be false. The mis-
leading uses of evidence in ads that persisted in the face of press correction 
included: 
o Clinton's claim that Dole was responsible for "900 billion in 
higher taxes," which appeared in four ads. Problem: it failed to 
credit Dole for his votes to cut taxes. 
o Dole's claim that "taxes are the highest in American history" (one 
ad) and its variant that Clinton gave Americans the "largest tax 
increase in history" (three ads). Problem: Federal taxes were not 
up. Adjusted for inflation, Clinton's tax increase was the second 
largest. 
o Clinton's claim (in two ads) that under Dole "Women's right to 
choose [is] gone." Problem: Dole said he would permit abortion in 
cases of incest or rape or when the mother's life was in danger. 
o Dole's claim that Clinton cut the Drug Control Office (three ads) 
and that the president's "own surgeon general even considered 
legalizing drugs" (two ads). Problem: The cuts had been restored, 
and Elders was speaking hypothetically. 
o Clinton's claim that Dole voted against creating a drug czar (two 
ads). Problem: He later voted for it. 
o Clinton's claim that there were 10 million new jobs (six ads). Prob-
lem: That figure counted only jobs gained, not jobs lost; it was not, 
in other words, a net figure. 
o Clinton's claim that Dole opposed vaccines for children (three 
ads). Problem: It was not clear that there was a need for the vac-
cine program in question. 
Despite at least one critique of each of these claims by a reporter, 
columnist, editorial writer, or academic, these errors persisted in the ads. 
Most found a home in the candidates' stump speeches as well. By contrast, 
in 1960, when the accuracy of a Kennedy ad was questioned, the ad was 
pulled from the air. When a 1968 Nixon ad drew protests, the campaign 
withdrew it. And when reporters pointed out a misstatement in a Reagan 
biographical ad, the ad was edited to correct the error. 
Why the high level of deception in 1996 but not in 1992? One possi-
bility is that with both broadcast and print coverage as well as public atten-
tion down, the consultants may have concluded that the public was not 
paying enough attention to catch the corrections. And since the best 
adwatches were done in print, not broadcast, most people in most markets 
missed them. Co
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One might also hypothesize that the candidates corrected ads that 
were criticized by large national organizations such as the AARP and 
Common Cause because those groups have heuristic value for voters. In 
the absence of such group pressure, the candidates failed to correct when 
the misleading statement was consistent with party heuristics and hence 
likely to override a single critical analysis here or there. So, for example, 
since we assume that Republicans are more eager than Democrats to cut 
social programs, Clinton continued to imply that the Republicans would 
cut Medicare despite Dole's assertions to the contrary. Since we assume 
that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to raise taxes, Dole's ads 
continued to claim that Clinton's tax increase was the largest in history 
and that it fell on the middle class. Since Republican Dole was presumed 
to oppose abortion rights, the notion that he would ban abortion outright 
functioned as a presumed logical extension of a heuristic inference. Since 
Republicans oppose federal government intervention, Dole would plausi-
bly oppose appointing a drug czar. 
Other problematic claims are natural extensions of the candidate's 
biography. Would Clinton cut funding for drug programs and appoint a 
surgeon general who favored legalization of drugs? Ifhe had smoked mar-
ijuana, initially deceived the press about it, and protested the war in Viet-
nam, with all the attendant associations of being an anti-establishment 
figure-perhaps. The cases of "Empty" and "Stripes" suggest as well that 
cultural consensus can affect candidate and consultant behavior. When 
reporters, columnists, scholars, and members of one's own party disap-
prove of an ad against the opposing candidate, and when the candidate 
also hears those objections from supporters at campaign events, the signal 
is probably more powerful than the one delivered by adwatching alone. 
A third explanation is more troubling. An October 1996 national sur-
vey conducted for the Annenberg Public Policy Center found that 78 per-
cent of respondents felt that candidates tell the public what it wants to 
hear, not what is best for the country. Thirty-eight percent believed that 
the candidates deceive the public rather than telling voters what accom-
plishments the candidates will pursue if they are elected. The candidates' 
disposition to put the best face on their records and the worst on their 
opponents' fuels cynicism. So too does press coverage that focuses on 
strategy rather than substance. And an electorate that pays little attention 
to conventions, debates, and news is a ready object of manipUlation. Per-
haps the candidates have concluded that unless the outcry is overwhelm-
ing, consistent, and includes objection from one's own party or major 
groups with high heuristic power, there is no penalty for living up to the 
low expectations they and we have created. Co
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Research on Adwatches 
One factor contributing to the relative infrequency of adwatches in the 
1996 election may have been the publication of Steven Ansolabehere and 
Shanto Iyengar's book Going Negative in late 1995, along with an article 
by the authors in the Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996). As part of a larger study on the effects 
of negative political advertising, Ansolabehere and Iyengar conducted 
an experiment on the effectiveness of adwatches. Their results suggested 
that adwatches can in some cases produce an increase in support for the 
candidate in question, which would appear to subvert the adwatch's 
intent. 
The findings received a good deal of press attention. Syndicated 
columnist David Broder, whose early endorsement of adwatches helped 
encourage their widespread adoption, recanted. In a column reporting the 
findings of Going Negative, Broder wrote, "one device that we hoped 
would help-ad watches ... appear[s] only to reinforce the negative con-
sequences .... The evidence is strong. The conclusions strike me as dead 
right" (1996, 34). In the New York Times Magazine, Max Frankel too 
reported that "Ansolabehere and Iyengar found no redeeming value in the 
media's attempts to critique and correct those negative ads" (1996, 18). 
While Broder and Frankel may have overstated the lessons that can be 
drawn from Ansolabehere and Iyengar's experiment, it seems reasonable 
to hypothesize that the concurrence of the dean of American political 
columnists and a respected former editor of the newspaper of record 
would have affected other editors' and reporters' willingness to conduct 
adwatches. 
While Ansolabehere and Iyengar located a "backfiring" effect of 
adwatches, other researchers have come to different conclusions. Pfau and 
Louden (1994) found in one case, but not in another, that adwatches 
showing ads full screen, contrary to Jamieson's (1992) original recommen-
dation, were more likely to backfire. Unfortunately, many broadcast 
adwatches do in fact show the ads full screen (Tedesco, McKinnon, and 
Kaid 1996). O'Sullivan and Geiger (1995) found that adwatches had their 
intended effect, boosting a candidate's support when the adwatch posi-
tively assessed the ad's claims and dampening support when the adwatch 
was critical. Using boxed adwatches with negative ads, Cappella and 
Jamieson (1994) found no backfiring; the adwatch did not affect viewers' 
assessments of the ad's target, although the adwatch did influence whether 
subjects found the ad to be fair. 
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The Future of Adwatches 
Reporters are caught in a difficult bind. On one hand, focusing primarily 
on ads that contain inaccuracies and deceptions helps keep campaigns 
honest; on the other, such a focus may contribute to voter cynicism by 
encouraging the conclusion that all political ads (and by extension all 
politicians) lie. An alternative would be to include ads that contain no 
deception. Praising spots that are accurate and fair might give candidates 
free advertising time, but doing so would also provide even greater incen-
tive for candidates to hew to the straight and narrow. Even in 1996, when 
the quantity of deception was relatively high, the majority of claims made 
in candidate advertising were in fact truthful. 
Perhaps journalists should consider themselves neither as ad review-
ers (commenting on strategy and effectiveness) nor as ad police. After all, 
the police go after criminals but do not spend time rewarding acts of 
virtue. If journalists considered adwatches a system of both punishment 
and reward, with both harmful and useful discourse highlighted, the mul-
tiple goals of influencing candidate behavior, increasing the accuracy of 
voter information, and dampening cynicism could all be served. 
Particularly at a time when candidates are buying larger and larger 
amounts of airtime, voters will inevitably see more ads than adwatches. It 
is therefore impossible for news organizations' critiques to forestall the air-
ing or blunt the impact of every deceptive ad. A more achievable goal is to 
help citizens become more critical viewers of political advertising. 
Adwatches advance a number of premises, among them that candidate 
claims are sometimes truthful and sometimes not and that ads should not 
be taken at face value unless outside confirmation is offered. To keep cam-
paigns honest, adwatches must sanction misbehavior. If they concentrate 
solely on strategy, adwatches simply reward deception. 
NOTES 
1. The quotes in this paragraph are from a December 12, 1992, postelection 
debriefing held at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
2. A March 1994 Wall Street JournallNBC News poll found that 45 percent of 
respondents said they opposed the Clinton plan, but when the plan was described 
without identifying its sponsor, 76 percent said it had "great appeal" ("Many 
Don't Realize It's Clinton Plan They Like," Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1994, 
B1). • 
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3. David Broder, "Health-Plan Ad Wars Confusing Public," Houston Chronicle, 
February 25, 1994, A22. 
4. December 12, 1992, postelection debriefing, Annenberg School. 
5. "Dole Ad Is Withdrawn after AARP Complains," Washington Post, October 
15,1996, A15. 
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